

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 MANAGU 03362 01 OF 03 280211Z
ACTION PM-05

INFO OCT-01 ARA-10 ISO-00 OMB-01 ACDA-12 MCE-00 AID-05
TRSE-00 HA-05 EB-08 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-10 L-03
NSAE-00 PA-01 SP-02 SS-15 COME-00 NSCE-00 SSO-00
ICAE-00 INRE-00 /079 W
-----112651 280223Z /61/15

O 251803Z JUL 78
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7223
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
USSOUTHCOM QUARRY HEIGHTS CANAL ZONE

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 1 OF 3 MANAGUA 3362

CORRECTED COPY-MRN 3362 VICE 0003 AS VALIDATED

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MASS, MPOL, NU
SUBJECT: SECURITY ASSISTANCE ASSESSMENT: NICARAGUA

REF: STATE 167901

SUMMARY: THE FOLLOWING DATA PROVIDES RESPONSES TO THE REFTEL
REQUEST FOR INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE.
END SUMMARY.

1. US INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES: US POLICY IN NICARAGUA IS
TO PROMOTE IMPROVED RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRATIC
CHANGE IN A COUNTRY WHICH HAS A TRADITION OF PERSONALISTIC,
AUTHORITARIAN GOVERNMENT. DURING THE PAST YEAR THERE HAVE
BEEN STEPS IN THIS DIRECTION AND, AT THE SAME TIME, THERE
HAVE BEEN HEIGHTENED POLITICAL POLARIZATION, REVOLUTIONARY
ACTIVISM, AND MILITANCE ON THE PART OF OPPOSITIONISTS WHICH
AT TIMES HAVE RESULTED IN PHYSICAL CONFRONTATION AND SOME ACTS OF
GON HEAVYHANDEDNESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES. THE US IS ALSO
INTERESTED IN PROMOTING

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 MANAGU 03362 01 OF 03 280211Z

THE DELIVERY OF DEVELOPMENTAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS TO THE
POOREST SEGMENTS OF NICARAGUA'S POPULATION WITH
MINIMAL DIVERSION OF SCARCE RESOURCES TO OTHER USES
SUCH AS EXCESSIVE MILITARY EXPENDITURES. A FURTHER US
INTEREST IS PROMOTING A PEACEFUL REGIONAL CLIMATE
WHICH FAVORS ECONOMIC AND DEMOCRATIC PROGRESS AS WELL
AS CONTINUANCE OF NICARAGUAN SUPPORT FOR US HEMISPHERE

POLICY. IN FURTHERANCE OF REGIONAL COOPERATION, THE US PARTICIPATES IN REGIONAL JOINT MILITARY ACTIVITIES. TO ADVANCE US OBJECTIVES REGARDING INTERNAL POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, THE US CONFRONTS A DILEMMA. WE DO NOT WANT TO BE ASSOCIATED WITH BOLSTERING THE GON (OR THE GN)(GUARDIA NACIONAL) WHICH ARESEEN BY OPPOSITIONISTS AS INSTRUMENTS OF REPRESSION OF POLITICAL DISSENT. AT THE SAME TIME, US INTERESTS WOULD NOT BE SERVED BY THE GON (OR THE GN) BECOMING SO WEAKENED THAT IT WOULD TIE ITS SURVIVAL TO INCREASED REPRESSION, E.G., REIMPOSITION OF MARTIAL LAW, OR BY PUBLIC ORDER YIELDING TO ANARCHY, OR BY UNDEMOCRATIC FORCES GAINING CONTROL. US POLICY INCLUDING SECURITY ASSISTANCE MUST, THEREFORE, BE FINELY TUNED TO PERMIT BOTH PUSHING THE GON AWAY FROM REPRESSION AND PULLING IT TOWARDS DEMOCRATIC CHANGE. THIS CANNOT BE DONE WITHOUT SOME LEVERAGE IN THE FORM OF A CONTINUING, ALTHOUGH MINIMAL TRADITIONAL ASSISTANCE RELATIONSHIP. THE US MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM HAS ALREADY BEEN REDUCED SO SIGNIFICANTLY IN TERMS OF US MILITARY PERSONNEL AND THE IMET TRAINING PROGRAM THAT IT HAS PROVIDED A CLIMATE IN WHICH THE GON HAS TURNED TO CONTRACT U.S. CIVILIANS TO PROVIDE TRAINING. THIS IN TURN HAD CAUSED THE US AS MUCH OF AN IMAGE PROBLEM AS THE PREVIOUS, LARGER US MILITARY PRESENCE. OPPOSITIONISTS FEEL THAT THE USG SHOULD IMPEDE THESE "MERCENARY" ACTIVITIES.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 MANAGU 03362 01 OF 03 280211Z

2. THREAT PERCEPTION (GON): THE GON'S MOST SERIOUS PERCEIVED EXTERNAL THREAT IS A CLANDESTINE OR OVERT INVASION BY CUBA. THIS PERCEPTION IS BASED ON KNOWLEDGE THAT CUBA CURRENTLY OFFERS FSLN GUERRILLA PROPAGANDA, TRAINING AND ORIENTATION SUPPORT. THE CUBAN-NICARAGUAN ANTAGONISM IS ALSO ACCENTUATED BY THE FACT THE GON OFFERED LAUNCHING PAD SUPPORT TO THE BAY OF PIGS INVASION. CUBAN PARTICIPATION IN AFRICA HAS HEIGHTENED NICARAGUAN FEARS. DISORDERS IN EL SALVADOR, GUATEMALA, AND RUSSIAN AND CUBAN DIPLOMATIC PRESENCE AND LABOR DIFFICULTIES IN COSTA RICA ARE VIEWED AS CONFIRMATION OF A COMMUNIST OFFENSIVE IN CENTRAL AMERICA. THERE IS ALSO A NERVOUSNESS REGARDING THE SUPERIOR MILITARY CAPABILITY OF ITS NORTHER NEIGHBOR, HONDURAS, ALTHOUGH THIS, AT PRESENT, IS PROBABLY CONSIDERED LOW LEVEL. INTERNALLY, THE PERCEIVED THREAT IS FROM THE FSLN GUERRILLAS WHICH HAVE THE DEMONSTRATED CAPABILITY FOR CROSS-BORDER OPERATIONS FROM COSTA RICA AND TO A LESSER EXTENT HONDURAS AGAINST MILITARY COMMANDS AS WELL AS THE ABILITY WITHIN THE COUNTRY TO INITIATE AMBUSHES OF GN PATROLS, OTHER VIOLENT ACTIONS DIRECTED AGAINST THE GON (AND GN) AND

THE CAPABILITY TO PROVOKE SERIOUS CIVIL DISTURBANCES.
THE LOCATION OF CONFRONTATION BETWEEN GON AND FSLN HAS
MOVED FROM COUNTRYSIDE TO MAJOR POPULATED AREAS.

3. THREAT PERCEPTION (MISSION): MISSION DOES NOT
BELIEVE AN OVERT OR COVERT DIRECT CUBAN PARTICIPATION
IN REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES IN NICARAGUAN TERRITORIAL
LIMITS IS LIKELY AT PRESENT. HOWEVER, GIVEN CUBAN MILITARY
ACTIVITIES IN AFRICA, SUCH AN EVENTUALITY CANNOT BE
COMPLETELY DISCOUNTED. THERE IS A MORE LIKELY POSSIBILITY
OF CUBA FACILITATING INCREASED INDIRECT SUPPORT (E.G.,
WEAPONS, TRAINING, OR FINANCING) TO THE FSLN. THE MISSION
BELIEVES THE GON'S PERCEPTION OF THE INTERNAL REVOLUTIONARY
THREAT IS REASONABLE.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 MANAGU 03362 01 OF 03 280211Z

4. MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT. THE GON HAS A UNITARY MILITARY
UNIFORMED SERVICE BASED ON STRUCTURE OF USMC ORGANIZATION
IN NICARAGUA IN 1930'S AND DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE
INTERESTED IN A HASTY CHANGE OF THAT STRUCTURE. HOWEVER, WITHIN
THE GN, CERTAIN KEY MEMBERS HAVE RECOMMENDED SEPARATION OF
POLICE AND ARMY FUNCTIONS. (NOTE: THIS IS A REFORM DEMANDED
BY THE OPPOSITION. AND THIS COULD BE ACCEPTED BY PRESIDENT
SOMOZA AS PART OF POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS. END NOTE).
THE GN HAS FOCUSED ON THE NEED FOR INTERNAL RESTRUCTURING
TOWARDS A REGIONAL COMMAND ORGANIZATION WHICH WOULD SEPARATE
THE CURRENT COMBINATION OF POLICE AND MILITARY FUNCTIONS
AT THE DEPARTMENTAL HEADQUARTERS. IT IS NOT KNOWN WHEN OR
WHETHER THIS PROPOSAL MIGHT BE IMPLEMENTED.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 MANAGU 03362 02 OF 03 252110Z
ACTION PM-05

INFO OCT-01 ARA-10 ISO-00 OMB-01 ACDA-12 MCE-00 AID-05
TRSE-00 HA-05 EB-08 CIAE-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00
SSO-00 ICAE-00 INRE-00 H-01 INR-10 L-03 PA-01
SP-02 SS-15 COME-00 /079 W
-----053189 252205Z /15

O 251803Z JUL 78

FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7224
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
US SOUTHCOM QUARRY HEIGHTS CANAL ZONE

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 02 OF 03 MANAGUA 3362

A RECENT INTERNAL RESTRUCTURING HAS RESULTED IN INCREASED
PREPAREDNESS AND MOBILITY FOR REACTIONFORCES.

5. FORCE ASSESSMENT: COINCIDENT WITH A US POLICY TO
DIMINISH MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO THE GN AND TO SUSPEND
WEAPONS SALES, THERE HAS BEEN AN INCREASE IN THE
REVOLUTIONARY CHALLENGE TO THE GON. THIS COMBINATION
OF EVENTS HAS LED THE GON TO RE-EVALUATE ITS TRADITIONAL
RELIANCE ON THE US FOR MILITARY SUPPORT, TO IMPROVE ITS
DEFENSE MANPOWER AND INCREASE EXPENDITURES AND HAS LED TO
INCREASED MILITARY PURCHASES FROM THIRD COUNTRIES. THE
LEVEL OF ARMAMENT OF THE GN IS QUITE UNSOPHISTICATED
AND COMMENSURATE WITH THE RESOURCE CAPABILITIES OF THE
COUNTRY. IT WOULD PROBABLY NOT BE POSSIBLE TO INFLUENCE
THE GON TOWARD REDUCED MILITARY EXPENDITURES OR A LOWER
FORCE LEVEL UNLESS THE US WERE PREPARED TO RESUME ITS
PREVIOUS ROLE AS THE PRIMARY AND RELIABLE SUPPLIER OF
MILITARY ASSISTANCE. EMB OULD ARGUE AGAINST SUCH A
POLICY REVERSAL UNDER THE PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES.

6. DEFENSE SPENDING: IN RECENT YEARS, DEFENSE SPENDING
WAS AT A LEVEL OF ABOUT, OR SLIGHTLY UNDER, 10 PERCENT
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 MANAGU 03362 02 OF 03 252110Z

OF THE BUDGET. IN 1977, DURING A PERIOD OF HEIGHTENED
GUERRILLA ACTIVITY AND SOCIAL UNREST, THERE WERE BUDGET
REALLOCATIONS WHICH RESULTED IN DEFENSE EXPENDITURES
RISING FROM THE BUDGETED LEVEL OF 9.7 PERCENT TO EXPENDITURES
OF 12.7 PERCENT. THESE RISES HAVE COINCIDED WITH REDUCTION
OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE FROM US. THE BUDGETED LEVEL
FOR 1978 IS 12.4 PERCENT, BUT IT APPEARS THAT THE STILL
INCREASING MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN OPERATIONS TO
DISSOLVE VIOLENT AND OTHER DISTURBANCES WILL RESULT IN
FURTHER REALLOCATIONS WHICH WILL FURTHER INCREASE THE
MILITARY SHARE OF THE BUDGET. THIS IS PARTICULARLY
LIKELY IN LIGHT OF A DETERIORATING ECONOMIC SITUATION
DURING WHICH THE GON IS UNDER PRESSURE TO REDUCE
GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES. IN LIGHT OF THE GON'S
PERCEIVED THREAT, MILITARY EXPENDITURE WILL PROBABLY
BE LESS SUBJECT TO CUTTING. EXPENDITURES FOR MILITARY
IMPORTS ARE NOT PUBLISHED AND NOT READILY AVAILABLE.
USMILGP ESTIMATES OF SUCH EXPENDITURES FOR CAPITAL
EQUIPMENT BASED ON INCOMPLETE INFORMATION INDICATE AN

IMPORT LEVEL OF ABOUT \$4.5 MILLION IN FY77 AND ABOUT \$4.2 MILLION IN FY78. THESE AMOUNTS REPRESENT LESS THAN ONE PERCENT OF TOTAL IMPORTS (CIF) OF \$758 MILLION IN 1977 AND GON ESTIMATED \$735 MILLION IN 1978. ALTHOUGH THE GON HAS DEBT-SERVICING PROBLEMS, AMOUNT SPENT ON MILITARY PURCHASES IS NOT CONSIDERED LARGE ENOUGH TO BE CONSIDERED A SIGNIFICANT PORTION OF THAT PROBLEM. THE EMB, TO DATE, HAS SEEN NO INDICATION OF DIVERSION OF FUNDS FROM DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS OR PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH COUNTERPART EXPENDITURES IN PROGRAMS INVOLVING AID LOANS WHICH CAUSE CONCERN.

7. ARMS CONTROL IMPACT: THE EMB BELIEVES THE LOW LEVEL OF PROJECTED GON PROCUREMENT OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 MANAGU 03362 02 OF 03 252110Z

TO REPRESENT NO INCREASE IN MILITARY SOPHISTICATION AND, THEREFORE, NOT ADVERSELY AFFECTING REGIONAL STABILITY.

8. HUMAN RIGHTS: THE HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE IS TREATED UNDER PARA 1 REGARDING US INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES. THE SITUATION IS ONE IN WHICH A CHOICE MUST BE MADE BETWEEN THE US BREAKING ITS MILITARY ASSISTANCE RELATIONSHIP COMPLETELY IN ORDER TO AVOID APPEARING TO SUPPORT A CURRENTLY UNPOPULAR REGIME WHICH WOULD RESULT IN REDUCED POSITIVE LEVERAGE AND COULD LEAD TO THE GON OPTING FOR RELIANCE ON OTHER COUNTRIES ESPECIALLY LATIN DICTATORSHIPS AND INCREASED REPRESSION, AND THE ALTERNATIVE OF CONTINUING ASSISTANCE (ALBEIT AT A MINIMAL AND SELECTIVE LEVEL) WHICH COULD ALIENATE OPPOSITION ELEMENTS BUT GIVE THE US THE LEVERAGE NECESSARY TO PROMOTE GRADUAL DEMOCRATIC EVOLUTION. THE EMB BELIEVES THE LATTER COURSE WILL ADVANCE US HUMAN RIGHTS INTERESTS MORE THAN WOULD ENTIRELY ENDING THE SECURITY ASSISTANCE RELATIONSHIP. AT THE SAME TIME, CONTINUED ASSISTANCE MUST BE CAREFULLY DESIGNED. WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO MAINTAIN OUR ABILITY TO PROMOTE US INTERESTS WITH A MINIMAL MILITARY SALES AND TRAINING PROGRAM WHICH AVOIDS SALES OF LETHAL WEAPONS, CROWD CONTROL EQUIPMENT, ETC.

9. OTHER SOURCE ASSISTANCE: THE GON IS RECEIVING MILITARY ASSISTANCE FROM OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE FORM OF MILITARY TRAINING (SEE MANAGUA 3116). A SECOND FORM OF ASSISTANCE IS MILITARY SALES, E.G., JEEPS FROM SPAIN, PATROL CRAFT FROM ISRAEL, TEARGAS FROM ARGENTINA, ETC. ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE FROM OTHER SOURCES IS PRIMARILY MULTILATERAL LENDING, HOWEVER, SPAIN MADE A MAJOR LOAN TO NICARAGUA IN 1977 TO COVER A MAJOR VEHICLE PURCHASE FROM THAT COUNTRY.

10. COUNTRY PROGRAM LEVELS: LEVEL 1, 2, AND 3 AS
DESCRIBED IN PARA (13)(A)(B)(C) OF REFTEL ARE NOT APPLIC-
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 MANAGU 03362 02 OF 03 252110Z

ABLE TO NICARAGUA DUE TO POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND
SUBSEQUENT SUSPENSIONS OF THE FMS-CREDIT PROGRAM AND
MINIMUM IMET PROGRAM DURING 1978. CURRENT LEVEL IS THE
MINIMUM LEVEL. FURTHER REDUCTION FROM THIS LEVEL WOULD
ELIMINATE THE SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM FOR NICARAGUA.
THEREFORE, LEVELS DESCRIBED BELOW REPRESENT POTENTIAL
DESIRED INCREMENTS ABOVE THE MINIMUM LEVEL.

INCREMENTAL LEVEL 1:

A. MAP - 0

B. FMS CREDIT - 0.8 MILLION

(1) DESCRIPTION. THIS LEVEL WILL ALLOW A LIMITED
ARMORED CAR ACQUISITION IF CONDITIONS WARRANT, OR ALTERNATIVE-
LY, PURCHASE OF OTHER LESS VISIBLE, NON-LETHAL SALES TOWARD
INITIATION OF A PROGRAM TO MODERNIZE THE GN ARMORED FORCES.

(2) RISK ASSESSMENT. FUNDING AT THIS LEVEL WILL
NOT PERMIT THE PROCUREMENT OF SUFFICIENT VEHICLES REQUIRED
TO REPLACE ALL VINTAGE EQUIPMENT AND OTHER
ARTICLES AND SERVICES REQUIRED TO SUSTAIN OPERATIONALLY-
READY FORCES. WITHOUT THIRD PARTY ACQUISITION, THE
ABILITY OF THE NICARAGUAN GOVERNMENT TO RESPOND TO THE
CURRENT WAVE OF TERRORISM WOULD BE SEVERELY DEGRADED.

(3) MILITARY CONSEQUENCES OF NOT APPROVING THIS
LEVEL. THE ARMORED FORCES RELY ON WW II US HALF-TRACKS
AND BRITISH STAGHOUND ARMORED CARS. THESE ARE RAPIDLY
DETERIORATING AND A REPLACEMENT PROGRAM HAS BEEN APPROVED
BY PRESIDENT SOMOZA. FAILURE TO PROVIDE THIS ALTERNATIVE
MAY RESULT IN THIRD COUNTRY ACQUISITION OF TRACKED
VEHICLES AND CARS IN NUMBERS FAR IN EXCESS OF THEIR
CAPABILITY TO EMPLOY OR MAINTAIN.

(C) IMET - 0.2 MILLION

(1) DESCRIPTION. DUE TO ASSESSMENT OF VARIABLE
COSTS FOR OPERATIONS OF CANAL ZONE SCHOOLS TO THE IMET
PROGRAM, THIS FIGURE, ALTHOUGH ABOVE THE FY 79 LEVEL, IS
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 05 MANAGU 03362 02 OF 03 252110Z

A REDUCTION FROM FY 78 PROGRAM. THIS LEVEL OF FUNDING
WILL ALLOW THE GUARDIA NACIONAL TO OBTAIN THE MAJORITY
OF THEIR CONUS/MTT REQUIREMENTS. SENIOR OFFICERS WILL
ATTEND THE ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE AND
THE SENIOR OFFICER DEFENSE MANAGEMENT ORIENTATION
COURSE. JUNIOR OFFICERS WILL BE SENT TO THE INFANTRY
OFFICER ADVANCED FOREIGN OFFICER NAVAL SUPPLY AND USMC

BASIC OFFICER COURSES. VERY LITTLE WILL REMAIN FOR
TRAINING OF NON- COMMISSIONED OFFICERS AND ENLISTED MEN.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 MANAGU 03362 03 OF 03 252151Z
ACTION PM-05

INFO OCT-01 ARA-10 ISO-00 OMB-01 ACDA-12 MCE-00 AID-05
TRSE-00 HA-05 EB-08 CIAE-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00
SSO-00 ICAE-00 INRE-00 H-01 INR-10 L-03 PA-01
SP-02 SS-15 COME-00 /079 W
-----053879 252209Z /15

O 251803Z JUL 78
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7225
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
USSOUTHCOM QUARRY HEIGHTS CANAL ZONE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 MANAGUA 3362

(2) RISK ASSESSMENT. THIS LEVEL REPRESENTS A
MODEST DECREASE FROM THE PROPOSED FY 78 LEVEL BECAUSE
OF THE APPLICATION OF VARIABLE COSTS TO IMET EVEN THOUGH
THE FIXED COSTS OF THE CANAL ZONE SCHOOLS ARE SEPARATELY
FUNDED.

(3) MILITARY CONSEQUENCES OF NOT APPROVING
INCREMENTAL LEVEL 1. NICARAGUA WILL ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN
TRAINING IN THOSE AREAS WHERE SELF-SUFFICIENCY DOES NOT
EXIST- LARGEMLY IN PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION COURSES
FOR OFFICERS. THIS WOULD BE, IN ESSENCE, A TURNING AWAY
FROM HER PREDOMINANTLY US ORIENTATION. IT IS EXPECTED
THAT IN LIGHT OF OVERTURES FROM OTHER LA COUNTRIES, ESPECIALLY
SOUTH AMERICAN DICTATORSHIPS, THE
GUARDIA WOULD BE PARTIALLY SUCCESSFUL IN THIS EFFORT.

(4) HUMAN RIGHTS. CONTINUED TRAINING WITH US
DOCTRINE AND IN US SCHOOLS IS LIKELY TO RESULT IN
GREATER ACCEPTANCE OF US HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY BY INCREASED
PROFESSIONALIZATION OF OFFICER CORPS, AND CONTACTS WITH
US PERSONNEL. THIS WOULD BE ESPECIALLY THE CASE IF CURRICULUM
CHANGES.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 MANAGU 03362 03 OF 03 252151Z

INCREMENTAL LEVEL 2:

- A. MAP - 0
- B. FMS CREDIT - 1.3 MILLION

(1) DESCRIPTION. THIS LEVEL WILL PERMIT, IF CONDITIONS WARRANT, THE INITIAL PURCHASE OF ARMORED CARS FOR THE URGENTLY-NEEDED ARMORED BATTALION MODERNATION PROGRAM AND TRUCKS TO REPLACE WORN OUT US MANUFACTURED MILITARY VEHICLES IN THE 1/4T TO 2-1/2T CLASSES. ALTERNATIVELY, OTHER LESMF VISIBLE, NON-LETHAL SALES COULD BE COVERED UNDER THIS ITEM.

(2) RISK ASSESSMENT. FUNDING AT THIS LEVEL WILL NOT PERMIT THE PURCHASE OF MANY VITALLY-NEEDED ARTICLES AND SERVICES.

CM IMET - 0.3 MILLION

(1) THE MODEST INCREASE WILL BRING THE FUNDING LEVEL UP TO THE PROPOSED FY 79 FIGURE, BEFORE THE ADDITION OF VARIABLE COSTS FOR CANAL ZONE SCHOOLS. IT WILL SATISFY MOST PRESENTLY KNOWN PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION REQUIREMENTS OF THE GUARDIA, IN CONJUNCTION WITH THEIR TRADITIONAL TRAINING PACKAGE FROM CANAL ZONE MILITARY SCHOOLS. THIS ASSUMES, OF CORSE, NO SIGNIFICANT INCREASE IN THE VARIABLE COSTS WILL BE ASSESSED AGAINST THE IMET PROGRAM.

(2) BENEFIT ASSESSMENT. THIS LEVEL OF FUNDING WILL SATISFY KNOWN REQUIREMENTS WITH THE EXCEPTION OF AVIATOR TRAINING.

(3) HUMAN RIGHTS. BECAUSE THIS LEVEL WILL ALLOW
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 MANAGU 03362 03 OF 03 252151Z

FOR A RETURN TO TRAINING OF THE NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICER AND ENLISTED CORPS, THE INFLUENCE OF US POLICY CAN BE EXPECTED TO PERMEATE FURTHER INTO THE RANKS OF THE GUARDIA. THE MAJORITY OF ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS HAVE BEEN BY ENLISTED PERSONNEL IN THE ABSENCE OF OFFICERS. TRAINING OF NCO'S AND EM WOULD ASSIST IN WIDENING THE INFLUENCE OF, AND GAINING COMPLIANCE WITH, US HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY.

INCREMENTAL LEVEL 3:

AM MAP - 0

B. FMS CREDIT - 2.5 MILLION

(1) DESCRIPTION. THIS LEVEL REPRESENTS THE LEVEL OF CREDIT PRIOR TO THE REDUCTIONS RELATED TO THE HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE AND, WITH CONSIDERATION OF INFLATIONARY FACTORS, IS A MODEST DECREASE FROM FY 77 CREDITS. THIS LEVEL WILL PERMIT THE PURCHASE OF OTHER ARTICLES AND SERVICES FOR REPLACEMENT/MODERNIZATION AND WOULD SATISFY THE ENTIRE RECOMMENDED FMSCR PROGRAM FOR THE COUNTRY FOR FY 80.

(2) BENEFIT ASSESSMENT. PURCHASE OF OTHER ARTICLES AND SERVICES WILL PROVIDE MATERIAL FOR DAY-TO-DAY OPERATIONS PERMITTING TRAINING, REPLACEMENT AND ADEQUATE MAINTENANCE SUPPORT AT THE OPERATING LEVEL.

(C) IMET - 0.4 MILLION

(1) DESCRIPTION. THIS LEVEL WOULD PERMIT THE INCREASED TRAINING OF ROTARY WING AVIATORS TO ALLOW FOR MORE EFFECTIVE USAGE OF EXISTING AND PROJECTED ROTARY WING ASSETS. PILOT LIMITATIONS DO NOT ALLOW FOR FULL UTILIZATION OF RESOURCES AND INCREASED TRAINING WOULD IMPROVE THE GN'S CAPABILITY TO EMPLOY PROJECTED ROTARY WING ASSETS FOR CIVIC ACTION PURPOSES.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 MANAGU 03362 03 OF 03 252151Z

(2) RISK BENEFIT ASSESSMENT. INCREASED CIVIC ACTION CAPABILITY COULD MEAN IMPROVED IMAGE OF THE GN WITHIN COUNTRY.

(3) HUMAN RIGHTS. CONSIDERABLE IMPROVEMENT COULD BE EFFECTED. THE ABILITY TO DEVOTE EQUIPMENT WITH SUCH LOCALLY HIGH VISIBILITY TO CIVIC ACTION COULD PROMOTE GENERAL INTEREST AMONG OFFICERS AND MEN OF THE GUARDIA TO EMBARK ON OTHER PROGRAMS AND RAISE THE GENERAL LEVEL OF CONSCIOUSNESS OF HUMAN RIGHTS CONSIDERATIONS. THE FOLLOWING ARE THE RECOMMENDED MANNING FOR THE RESPECTIVE LEVELS:

LEVEL 1 (MINIMUM LEVEL)

4 OFFICERS 1 DOD CIVILIAN 2 LWR

- . DESCRIPTION. THIS MANNING LEVEL IS NECESSARY TO PROVIDE 3 SERVICE REPRESENTATION TO THE THREE SEPARATE ARMS OF THE GUARDIA NACIONAL WHICH ARE WIDELY SEPARATED IN THEIR COMMAND AND CONTROL AND LOGISTICS ELEMENTS AND FACILITIES. THIS LEVEL ALSO ALLOWS THE SECURITY

ASSISTANCE ORGANIZATION TO PROVIDE THAT PORTION OF ITS
ADMINISTRATION WHICH CANNOT BE ABSORBED BY THE US MISSION.
ONLY MINIMUM CLERICAL CAPABILITY IS PRESENT IN THIS LEVEL.

B. RISK ASSESSMENT. FAILURE TO PROVIDE THIS MANNING
LEVEL WOULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO PROVIDE SERVICE
REPRESENTATION AND AN INABILITY TO SUPPORT AND MANAGE
THE SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM.

C. HUMAN RIGHTS. THIS MINIMUM MANNING LEVEL WILL
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 05 MANAGU 03362 03 OF 03 252151Z

REQUIRE THAT ASSIGNED PERSONNEL ABSORB A NUMBER OF
ADMINISTRATIVE TASKS.

LEVEL 2 (INTERMEDIATE LEVEL)

5 OFFICERS 2 DOD CIVILIANS 2 LWR

A. DESCRIPTION. THIS MANNING LEVEL PROVIDES AN
INCREASED ABILITY TO MANAGE AND ADMINISTER THE SECURITY
ASSISTANCE PROGRAM BY FREEING THE OFFICERS OF SOME
ADMINISTRATIVE TASKS.

B. BENEFIT ASSESSMENT. IMPROVED ABILITY OF THE
OFFICERS TO ENGAGE IN CONTACTS WITH MEMBERS OF THE GUARDIA
NACIONAL WILL IMPROVE THE QUALITY OF THE PROGRAM ADMIN-
ISTRATION.

C. HUMAN RIGHTS. A MODEST INCREASE IN THE ABILITY
OF THE PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO EFFECT IMPORTANT APPROPRIATE
CONTACTS WITH KEY PERSONNEL CAPABLE OF IMPROVING COM-
PLIANCE WITH US HUMAN RIGHTS OBJECTIVES.

LEVEL 3 (CURRENT)

6 OFFICERS 3 DOD CIVILIANS 2 LWR
(N.B. MANNING IS PRESENTLY 4 OFFICERS AND 2 LWR, I.E.N
2 OFFICERS BELOW AUTHORIZATION AND THIS LEVEL MIGZT BE
KEPT THROUGH 1980).

A. DESCRIPTION. THIS SIZE GROUP PROVIDES THE
OPTIMIM LEVEL WITH CAPACITY TO MANAGE AND ASSESS IN COUNTRY
SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM AND SERVICE REPRESENTATION.
IT EXTENDS THE TECHNICAL CAPABILITY
OF THE ORGANIZATION TO INCLUDE MAINTENANCE AREAS AND
PROVIDES A MORE APPROPRIATE ARMY REPRESENTATION
CONSISTNET WITH THE UNIQUE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 06 MANAGU 03362 03 OF 03 252151Z

GUARDIA NACIONAL.

B. BENEFIT ASSESSMENT. PROVIDES FOR FULL TIME CAPABILITY FOR MANAGEMENT OF THE SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM AND ALSO PROVIDES REQUIRED ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTIONS.

C. HUMAN RIGHTS. THIS OPTIMUM LEVEL PERMITS THE SECURITY ASSISTANCE ORGANIZATION TO FULFILL ITS ROLE AS AN INSTRUMENTALITY OF FOREIGN POLICY BY ITS INCREASED ABILITY TO ARTICULATE THOSE POLICIES AT VARIOUS LEVELS AND ORGANIZATIONS. INCREASED CONTACTS OF MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY ASSISTANCE ORGANIZATION COULD BE EXPECTED TO RESULT IN IMPROVED COMPLIANCE WITH HUMAN RIGHTS OBJECTIVES.

11. AMBASSADOR'S ESTIMATE: IT IS DIFFICULT TO PROGNOSTICATE WHAT IS LIKELY TO OCCUR IN NICARAGUA OVER THE NEXT FEW YEARS. U.S. POLICY INCLUDING THE MILITARY ASSISTANCE RELATIONSHIP WILL BE AN IMPORTANT INFLUENCE OVER EVENTS. I BELIEVE THAT THE MILITARY ASSISTANCE RELATIONSHIP SHOULD BE CONTINUED AT A MINIMUM LEVEL FOR THE REASONS DESCRIBED ABOVE. IF THE CURRENT INSTABILITY AND POLITICAL TURMOIL SHOULD CONTINUE, THE APPROPRIATE LEVELS WOULD BE THE MINIMUM FMS-CREDIT, IMET AND US MILITARY PERSONNEL LEVELS OUTLINED ABOVE. THE CIRCUMSTANCES COULD CHANGE IN TERMS OF A POLITICAL COMPROMISE IN WHICH RESPONSIBLE OPPOSITION AND GON SUPPORTERS DECIDE TO DRAW TOGETHER TO OPPOSE NON-DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARIES. ALTERNATIVELY, A NEW GOVERNMENT COULD ARISE WHICH COULD BE THREATENED BY FURTHER CHALLENGES FROM REVOLUTIONARIES OR THE MILITARY. IN EITHER OF THESE CASES, THE US WOULD WISH TO REVIEW MILITARY ASSISTANCE LEVELS.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 07 MANAGU 03362 03 OF 03 252151Z

SOLAUN

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptoning: X
Capture Date: 01 jan 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: MILITARY ASSISTANCE, SECURITY, MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 25 jul 1978
Decapton Date: 01 jan 1960
Decapton Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978MANAGU03362
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D780309-0254
Format: TEL
From: MANAGUA
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t19780724/aaaaatrq.tel
Line Count: 591
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 9fdbd676d-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION PM
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 11
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: 78 STATE 167901
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 30 mar 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 1896964
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: SECURITY ASSISTANCE ASSESSMENT: NICARAGUA
TAGS: MASS, MPOL, NU
To: STATE DOD
Type: TE
vdkgvgwkey: odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/9fdbd676d-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014